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GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND LOCAL POLITICS
FREDERICK TIPSON*
In view of the short time which remains, I will depart from my
planned remarks and emphasize just a few of the points which I had
intended to cover. Perhaps that is just as well, in view of my inability
to be present yesterday for the first part of this excellent symposium.
I would, however, refer you to the outstanding survey of the telecom-
munications industry which appeared in The Economist of September
30th-the best short summary I have seen of what is taking place in
the broader industry of which AT&T is a part. Based on the discus-
sion today, I would emphasize three points: the pace and depth of
change, the importance of key individuals, and the clarification of val-
ues underlying public policy.
I may be accused of exaggeration, but I would suggest that the
information and communications technologies we see all around us
are changing our world so quickly, and in ways which are so profound,
that even three years from now we will hardly recognize the world as
we now know it today-particularly in the way our economic lives are
conducted, both individually and in business. Three years may not be
quite right, but it is a very short-term transformation that I have in
mind. The impact of technological change often drags a bit from the
initial availability of a new application, but at some point there tends
to be an acceleration and combination of impacts which we are now
witnessing in the computer and telecommunications area, and which
will soon assume even more breathless dimensions. Already we have
seen huge changes in the way that industries are being restructured
and in how companies operate-changes which are largely the conse-
quence of these technologies.
These impacts are so fundamental because they affect some very
basic elements of social life: our identities as individuals, the way eco-
nomic value is determined, our sense of security, and our attitudes to-
ward political authority. John Jackson referred to the problematic
concept of state sovereignty. Sovereignty, like nationalism, is a muta-
ble and variable abstraction which nevertheless retains great political
resilience and importance. At the same time, it is often asserted in the
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face of circumstances which illustrate its obsolescence. In fact, for
many purposes, it has become almost quaint to talk about "national"
components of any given industry. This is not to suggest that national
decision-makers do not have a critical impact on global industries-
they remain in many industries, including telecommunications, key in-
fluencers in the shaping of competitive conditions. But unless the na-
tional regulators evaluate industry on a global basis, they are likely to
make wrong decisions, or at best irrelevant ones. This reality is in-
creasingly clear in the telecommunications industry, where the pace
and depth of change often leaves national regulators in the dust.
At the global level, our regulatory approaches are not keeping
pace with the industries we seek to oversee. When I worked on the
staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was my job,
among others, to see that treaties were handled effectively by the
Committee and then shepherded through the process of Senate advice
and consent. This process often required years to complete, and in the
case of some treaties resulted in more than a decade's delay from the
time of Presidential submission while the agreements waited on the
Committee's calendar for sufficient support to get them moving.
Based on this experience, I am especially aware of how clumsy the
treaty-making process can be-not only the negotiation phase of
course, but also the process of ratification, implementation, and
amendment. Making policy by the treaty mechanism requires enor-
mous commitments of time, resources, and domestic political capi-
tal-not to mention the danger of a lowest-common-denominator
outcome rather than an optimal solution.1 The Uruguay Round of
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATIT"), the Law of the
Sea Convention, the Non-Proliferation regime-each have been
landmark achievements but have required enormous expenditures of
time, talent and political opportunity costs. And their ultimate effec-
tiveness is still dependent on our eventual success at implementation
and amendment.
The telecommunications industry in particular has outpaced the
plodding, state-centered processes of its multilateral overseer, the In-
ternational Telecommunication Union ("ITU"). Several fundamental
principles of the ITU framework are now disregarded with virtual im-
1. The point is less valid, of course, in the case of international agreements requiring Con-
gressional approval by majority vote rather than Senate advice and consent-particularly where
fast track approval processes are legislated in advance, as in the case of multilateral trade agree-
ments. Nevertheless, the clumsiness and delay of the Uruguay Round process illustrates similar
problems surrounding the construction and maintenance of international "regimes."
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punity, and the process of agreeing on new principles remains slow
and incomplete at best. In fact, these days the more important pro-
cess seems to be what we might call that of "parallel politics,"
whereby officials in one country take their cues and ideas from those
in other countries-take each other's "regulatory seminars," so to
speak-in deciding how best to frame their own policies. In other
words, the traditional multilateral framework is often less useful and
influential than that of other countries' examples-or, in the case of
the European Commission, the policies embodied at the regional
level. Having said this, I should note that in fact the GATT/World
Trade Organization ("WTO") have been trying, in effect, to steal
some of the ITU's turf and thunder by reaching a market access
agreement for telecommunications services which effectively bypasses
the state-control mentality which still hangs up the ITU: "dualing mul-
tilateral regimes," we might call this. But meanwhile, as I have said,
the industry outpaces both of them.
On this point of "parallel regulation," let me turn to my second
point of emphasis-the critical importance of individual talent in de-
vising positive policies. In my current role at AT&T, I work to assure
some consistency in the positions we take on regulatory issues around
the world, and what quickly becomes obvious is how much difference
it makes for foreign governments and multilateral institutions to have
dedicated experts-as distinct from opportunistic politicians or con-
servative bureaucrats-in key positions of regulation and policy-mak-
ing. Because the telecom industry is changing at such a pace-and
with such enormous economic implications for each economy-it
makes a critical difference whether or not a country has the people in
place who can make sensible and often controversial decisions in the
interest of the broad public of that country, and can do so within the
short time frames necessary to allow competition and technology to
unleash the capabilities of the industry so that the country is not dis-
advantaged or left behind. Information and telecommunication tech-
nology has, in fact, unleashed capabilities which create a race among
industries and economies, which regulation can either facilitate or im-
pede. Where it delays or distorts the application of these capabilities,
entire sectors can be hobbled in the arena of global competitiveness-
sometimes irreparably.
Therefore, the quality, empowerment, and continuity of individ-
ual decision-makers becomes a key factor in the quality of a country's
responses to changes in the global industry. We learn to appreciate
those governments which give appropriate authority to capable peo-
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pie and then keep them in place long enough to execute some consis-
tent approaches. I would not want to seem to be "buttering up"
Professor Ehlermann by placing him in that category, but he is an ex-
ample from DGIV of the European Commission of just such con-
tinuity of talent, and he was able to engineer some further continuity
after his retirement by seeing to the appointment to DGIV of Herbert
Ungerer from DGXIII to oversee the further development and imple-
mentation of telecommunications competition policy. Dr. Ungerer
has been able, largely through the strength of his intellect and con-
tinuity, to exercise enormous impact on the quality of the Commis-
sion's approach to telecommunications regulation in Europe. But
there are other individuals around the world of comparable impact,
such as Alex Arena in Australia and then Hong Kong, Stuart McPher-
son in Canada, Neil MacMillan in the United Kingdom, and Rafael
del Villar in Mexico, to cite just a few.
I hope you will forgive me if I avoid jumping into the Lion's Den
by trying to name my favorite telecommunications regulators in the
United States. But I would note in the area of antitrust regulation
that the United States has not always maintained the kind of consis-
tency and continuity on international telecom matters which would
have been helpful in positioning the United States industry within the
global political game. Indeed, the Justice Department is an example
of how the differences from one U.S. administration to another can
result in significant swings in approaches to regulatory policy.
And this observation leads to my last point, about underlying val-
ues. Most regulation in the telecom industry, and indeed that of anti-
trust regulation in particular, derives theoretically from arguments
about economic efficiency and consumer welfare which place the as-
surance of efficient competition as the hallmark objective of policy.
At AT&T, that is the emphasis we are consistently trying to place in
our arguments about public policy and regulation. Yet we also recog-
nize that in the political processes surrounding such industry regula-
tion, there are other values which enter into the calculation-
particularly outside of the United States, but within our country as
well. These have to do, among others, with distributive and welfare
objectives, such as those surrounding universal service, or short-term
"protective" objectives involving the delay of negative impacts on par-
ticular constituencies or companies, such as protecting jobs in certain
factories or localities-objectives which may not be justified in com-
parison with some larger or longer-term objective for the industry in
question, but which have powerful political salience nonetheless. The
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pace of privatization and liberalization has been slowed significantly
in countries like Germany, France, and Spain-as well as Brazil, Mex-
ico, and India-by concerns about the immediate impact upon jobs in
the traditional telecom monopolies. Certainly it can be argued that
these delays have come at the expense of national competitiveness-
not just in telecommunications, but in consequent drag on other in-
dustries-but they do illustrate the complex mix of values which un-
derlie policy resolution in a given political system. In effect, what we
often see is that the longer-term objective of greater economic effi-
ciency ultimately prevails over the shorter-term objective of "cushion-
ing" or stringing out the impacts of this transition. Those systems
which delay this balance too long, however, risk undercutting their
entire industry-with the long-run result of an even greater net loss of
jobs. Some countries may already have misjudged this equation.
